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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of misfit between competitive environ-
ment, business strategy and control structure on performance. We argue that the misfit between competi-
tive environment, business strategy and control structure has significant negative implications on share-
holder value creation associated with firms’ Joint Venture formation. Based on data of  publicly-traded
US manufacturing firms that announce a joint venture formation, we found that firms that have perfect
fit are valued higher than those with both strategy and structural misfits and also those with structural
misfit. Contradictory results were found when comparing firms with perfect fit with those that have
strategy misfit. Further analyses indicate that all those strategy misfit firms operate in high entry barriers,
where firms can compete effectively using either innovation or cost efficiency strategy due to the fact that
they possess resources that are difficult to be imitated by their competitors.
Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh dari ketidaksesuaian (misfit) antara lingkungan
kompetitif, strategi bisnis dan struktur pengendalian terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Hipotesis yang diuji
adalah ketidaksesuaian (misfit) antara lingkungan kompetitif, strategi bisnis dan struktur pengendalian
berdampak negatif terhadap penciptaan nilai  bagi pemegang saham yang berasosiasi dengan bentuk joint
venture perusahaan.  Berdasarkan data dari perusahaan manufaktur di AS yang mengumumkan joint venture,
ditemukan bahwa perusahaan yang mempunyai kesesuaian sempurna (perfect fit) memiliki nilai yang lebih
tinggi dibanding dengan yang memiliki ketidaksesuaian (misfit) strategi dan ketidaksesuaian (misfit) struktural
serta yang memiliki ketidaksesuaian (misfit) struktural saja.  Penelitian ini juga menemukan hasil yang
bertentangan jika perusahaan dengan kesesuaian sempurna dibandingkan dengan ketidaksesuaian (misfit)
strategi saja.  Analisis lebih lanjut mengindikasikan perusahaan dengan ketidaksesuaian strategi beroperasi
di lingkungan dengan entry barriers tinggi, yaitu kondisi pada saat perusahaan dapat berkompetisi secara
efektif  menggunakan strategi inovasi ataupun efisiensi biaya.  Hal ini disebabkan perusahaan-perusahaan
tersebut memiliki sumber daya yang sulit  untuk ditiru oleh pesaing  mereka.
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The formation of  domestic as well as
international joint ventures (IJVs) is typically
based on the premise that the new ventures
will create shareholder value for participat-
ing firms. Yet, empirical studies investigat-
ing the capital market implications of joint
venture formation have reported mixed and
often contradictory results. Indeed, recent
surveys have documented just how perva-
sive and severe these inconsistencies are
(Robson et al. 2002). Not only have studies
failed to establish whether joint venture for-
mation creates shareholder value for parents,
there is little consistency across studies re-
garding the impact of individual variables on
such value creation (Merchant 2000).
One reason for the mixed results seems
to be the approach adopted in previous re-
search which, usually, has investigated the
singular effect of strategic and macro-eco-
nomic variables on parents’ shareholder
value. Indeed, prior joint venture studies
have seldom explicitly recognized the con-
tingent nature of relationships among par-
ents’ competitive environment, JV strategy,
JV control structure, and shareholder value
(e.g., Merchant 2000; Sim and Ali 1998). This
neglect is surprising because scholars in stra-
tegic management (e.g., Miller 1987) as well
as other fields such as accounting (e.g., Bruns
and Waterhouse 1975) have argued for the
need to consider these elements simulta-
neously. Moreover, researchers have fre-
quently reported that fit among firms’ envi-
ronment, strategy and structure has a posi-
tive effect on firm performance (e.g.,
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith 1988; Gupta
and Govindrajan 1984; Jermias and Gani
2004; Miller 1987; Miller and Freisen 1982;
Robinson and McDougall 2001; Rumelt
1974). In fact, a recent study suggested that
fit among internal and external variables af-
fected shareholder value creation via JVs
(Merchant 2004).
This study advances the JV literature
by engaging a contingency perspective to
better understand the shareholder valuation
effects associated with firms’ JV formation.
Drawing upon insights offered in the strat-
egy and accounting literatures, this study ar-
gues that creation of shareholder value as-
sociated with JV formation depends on the
(initial) fit among environment, strategy, and
control structure. Moreover, the study
deconstructs the notion of  organizational fit
(misfit) in terms of: i) strategy fit (misfit) and
ii) control structure fit (misfit). It investigates
the individual as well as joint effects of strat-
egy-structure fit (misfit) on parents’ share-
holder value. Specifically, the study predicts
that capital markets will evaluate strategy
and/or structure misfits less favorably rela-
tive to the case where both these elements
agree with the demands of JVs’ competitive
environment.
Examining the performance impact of
strategy-structure misfits in the context of
international JVs is important because as
many as 80 percent of these ventures fail to
achieve their intended objectives (Kanter
1989) and sparse explanations of such fail-
ures in the literature (Robson et al. 2002).
Indeed, as Burton et al. (2002) argue, it is
empirically and managerially important to
investigate the impact of organizational mis-
fits because managers react to them due to
their performance implications. Thus, this
study asks the following research question:
Given parents’ competitive environment,
how do capital markets evaluate JV strategy
and/or JV control structure misfits vis-à-vis
“perfect fit” when international JVs are first
publicly announced?
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The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the
JV literature pertaining to influences on share-
holder value creation via JVs. Section 3 gen-
erates the study’s hypotheses whereas section
4 describes its methodology. Section 5 reports
the study’s findings. The final section dis-
cusses these findings and highlights key im-
plications for future research.
Literature Review
Given the popularity of JVs, numerous
studies have investigated the relationship
between JV formation and shareholder value
creation (e.g., Gulati 1998). Although these
studies have identified a wide array of influ-
ences on parents’ capital market perfor-
mance, most of these influences can be con-
veniently grouped into three categories of
variables: i) environmental variables, ii) stra-
tegic variables, and iii) structural variables.
In the first group belong macro variables such
as cultural distance between parents’ home
countries, level of political risk in the JV host
country, and industry conditions in parents’
core business (e.g., Lummer and McConnell
1990; Madhavan and Prescott 1995; Park and
Ungson 1997). In the second group belong
indicators of parents’ JV strategies; they in-
clude variables such as parent-venture busi-
ness relatedness, type(s) of functional activ-
ity to be undertaken via JVs, and parents’ JV
motivations (e.g., Bleeke and Ernst 1991;
Das, Sen and Sengupta 1998; Koh and
Venkatraman 1991). Finally, the third group
consists of  structural variables such as eq-
uity distribution between partners and JV
decision-making structure (e.g., Harrigan
1988; Lummer and McConnell 1990; Saxton
1997).
Hypothesis Development
As noted earlier, previous research into
the relationship between above-mentioned
variables and parents’ shareholder value has
often reported contradictory results. Recent
JV studies have suggested the lack of  con-
tingency perspective as a potential reason for
these conflicting findings (Merchant 2000;
Sim and Ali 1998). More positively, it would
be useful to move towards a study of inter-
actions among theoretically inter-connected
variables (e.g., Ginsberg and Venkatraman
1985).
Harvey (1982) argues a contingency ap-
proach to strategy research is based on the
premise that an optimal strategy exists for a
given set of  environmental and firm-specific
conditions. Likewise, Sandberg (1986) sug-
gests that to create economic wealth for them-
selves, firms must align their strategies and
structural variables to achieve a fit with their
competitive environment. Thus, a model for
testing contingent relationships among envi-
ronment, strategy and structure assumes that
a fit across these variables will generate bet-
ter performance than will a misfit (Doty et
al. 1993). Conversely, misfit across these vari-
ables will lower firm performance relative to
the scenario where these elements are aligned.
Figure 1 shows the contingent relation-
ship between environment, strategy and con-
trol structure. Cells 4 and 5 indicate the per-
fect fit among these three variables. Firms in
Cell 4 are those operate in an environment
characterized by low entry barriers, choose a
strategy of  efficiency, and adopt a dominant
control structure. Firms in Cell 5 are those
operate in an environment characterized by
high entry barriers, choose a strategy of  in-
novation, and adopt a shared control struc-
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ture. Cells 2 and 7 indicate the strategy mis-
fit. Firms in cell 2 are those operate in an
environment characterized by low entry bar-
riers, choose a strategy of  innovation, and
adopt a dominant control structure. Firms in
cell 7 are those operate in an environment
characterized by high entry barriers, choose
a strategy of  cost efficiency, and adopt a
shared control structure. Cells 3 and 6 indi-
cate the structural misfit. Firms in Cell 3 are
those operate in an environment character-
ized by low entry barriers, choose a strategy
of  efficiency, and adopt a shared control
structure. Firms in Cell 6 are those operate
in an environment characterized by high en-
try barriers, choose a strategy of  innovation,
and adopt a dominant control structure. Cells
1 and 8 indicate both strategy and structural
misfits. Firms in cell 1 are those operate in
an environment characterized by low entry
barriers, choose a strategy of  innovation, and
adopt a shared control structure. Firms in cell
8 are those operate in an environment char-
acterized by low entry barriers, choose a strat-
egy of  cost efficiency, and adopt a dominant
control structure.
We predict that strategy and structural
misfits, structural misfit alone, and strategy
misfit alone, are associated with shareholder
value destruction. Foster (1986) proposes
that contextual variables such as competitive
environment and strategic orientation of the
firms should be taken into consideration
when investigating the relationship between
types of  control and firm performance. Other
researchers (e.g., Manu 1992; Douglas and
Rhee 1989) speculate that an important is-
sue in examining the relationship between
Figure 1. The Contingent Relationship Among Environment, Strategy, and Control Struc-
ture
Strategy
Innovation Cost Efficiency
Shared Control Structure Shared Control Structure
Strategy and Structural Structural Misfit
Misfit (1)
Low Entry Dominant Control Structure Dominant Control Structure
Barriers Strategy Misfit (2) Perfect Fit (4)
Environment Shared Control Structure Shared Control Structure
Perfect Fit (5) Strategy Misfit (5)
High Entry Dominant Control Structure Dominant Control Structure
Barriers Structural Misfit (6) Strategy and Structural
Misfits (8)
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structural/strategic variables and perfor-
mance is the extent to which differences in
environmental conditions influence the stra-
tegic orientation and types of  control struc-
ture for optimum performance.
We adopt the environment-strategy-
structure paradigm proposed by Lenz, (1981)
to investigate the joint effects of environ-
ment, strategy, and control structure on share-
holder value at the announcement of IJV for-
mation. This approach suggests that business
environment serves as important factors in
the strategy formulation (Hambrick 1982;
Bourgeois 1985; Anderson and Paine 1975)
and control structures are adopted to suit the
firm’s chosen strategy (Rumelt  1974;
Channon 1973; Chandler 1962). A fit among
environment, strategy and control structure
will positively affect performance. This ap-
proach is based on the premise that there is
no one best way to organize, and that any
one way of organizing is not equally effec-
tive under all conditions (Galbraith 1973).
Rather, this approach suggests that a firm
should select a strategy that matches the en-
vironment in which the firm operates and the
chosen strategy should be aligned with a
proper control structure to positively affect
performance.
Strategy Misfit (Cell 2 and 7)
The strategy misfit deals with environ-
ment and strategy relationship. The premise
is that competitive environment (i.e., entry
barriers) influences a firm’s strategic choice.
When a firm enters into joint ventures with
few resources whose deployment outcomes
competitors cannot duplicate (i.e., low entry
barriers), current or potential competing firms
can implement the same strategy but using
different resources to erode the firm’s sus-
tainable competitive advantage (Dierickx and
Cool 1989; Reed and DeFillippi 1990). Such
erosion fundamentally stems from reduction
in the level of causal ambiguity (Lippman
and Rumelt 1982) surrounding the socially
complex architecture of resources deployed
(Dierickx and Cool 1989) by the firm. Reed
and DeFillipi, (1990) argue that the reduc-
tion of ambiguity allows the competitors to
observe and understand the source of  com-
petitive advantage and permit them to target
their actions with the result that the erosion
in the firm’s sustainable competitive environ-
ment will occur at a greater rate. In such an
environment, firms should plan their activity
reasonably well, meet the competition, and
realize efficiency (Burton et al. 2002). High
performing firms in an environment charac-
terized by low entry barriers are those who
adopt a strategy of  cost efficiency by focus-
ing on aggressive construction of  efficient
scale facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost re-
duction from experience, tight cost and over-
head control, avoidance of marginal customer
accounts, and cost minimization in areas like
research and development, service, sales
force, and advertising (Porter 1985). A cost
efficiency firm tries to keep its product of-
ferings stable over time and focus on narrow
product lines in order to minimize inventory
carrying costs as well as to benefit from scale
economies (Gupta 1987). Although these
practices reduce the firms’ ability to innovate
and to respond to changes in competitive en-
vironment, they increase efficiency. There-
fore, a cost efficiency strategy is a fit with
low entry barrier environment but a misfit
with high entry barrier environment.
In contrast, a firm who enters into joint
ventures under high entry barriers signals a
more profitable resource deployment as com-
pared to those of incumbent and potential
competitors (Bleeke and Erns 1991; Heil and
Robertson 1991; Rotem and Amit 1996). The
lack of  that firm’s sensitivity to its rivals’
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actions indicates that such firm has resources
whose competitive advantage can only be
minimally eroded by competitors (Richardson
1959), at least in the short-term. This would
be the case when the firm possesses resources
that are valuable, rare, non-imitable, non-sub-
stitutable, and non-tradable (Barney 1991;
Dierickx and Cool 1989). In such an envi-
ronment, firms tend to have enough resources
to invest in research and development activi-
ties to increase their competitive advantage
in terms of  unique resources/products. High
performing firms in high entry barrier envi-
ronment tend to select one or more attributes
that many customers in an industry perceive
as important and uniquely positions them-
selves to meet those needs (Porter 1985). To
support their strategy of  producing innova-
tive and unique products, it is essential that
firms invest in research and development
activities to produce new and innovative
products that are superior to others in the mar-
ket (Mia and Clarke 1999). Firms will then
be rewarded by their ability to command pre-
mium prices and generate long term profit-
ability (Calantone et al. 1995). In addition,
innovative products can also create barriers
to entry of rivals, attract new customers, and
change the rules of  competition in the indus-
try (Golder and Tellis 1993). Innovative firms
tend to be characterized by higher costs from
innovation and are not focused on efficiency.
Their ability to project into the environment
with new ideas and products will sustain their
competitive advantage in terms of  difficult-
to-imitate resources and outcomes. Therefore,
a strategy of  innovation is a fit with an envi-
ronment characterized by high entry barriers
but a misfit with an environment character-
ized by low entry barriers.
The relationship between environment
and strategy has been well studied (Miles and
Snow 1978; Por ter 1985; Miller 1987;
Venkatraman and Prescott 1990) and empiri-
cal findings tend to support the environment-
strategy linkage (Zahra 1996; Adler 1989;
Miller 1987; Bourgeois 1985). Based on a
survey of  established manufacturing compa-
nies in southeastern states, Zahra (1996), for
example, found that firms operate in high
entry barriers tend to choose a strategy of
pioneering, and radical product technologies
while firms operate in a low entry barrier tend
to choose a strategy of  followership and in-
cremental product and process technologies.
Miller, (1987) use both published American
database (called static variable) and question-
naire sent to Canadian and Australian com-
panies (called change variable) to investigate
the impact of competitive environment on
the strategy formulation. He reports that the
level of environmental pressure (i.e., entry
barriers) was positively associated with the
strategy of  innovation but was negatively
associated with conservative cost control
strategy. Bourgeois (1985) uses a combina-
tion of  interview, questionnaires and second-
ary data, to investigate the impact of fit be-
tween environment and strategy on firm per-
formance. He found that congruence between
environmental uncertainty and firm strategy
is positively related to economic performance.
That is, when the barriers to entry are low,
high performing firms are those that pursue
a strategy of  cost efficiency whereas in an
environment characterized by high entry bar-
riers, high performing firms are associated
with a strategy of  innovation. Using Miles
and Snow’s strategic typology, Hambrick
(1982) found that strategic differences be-
tween prospectors (firms that focus on inno-
vation) and defenders (firms that focus on
efficiency) occur primarily through internal
analysis of the environment and political pro-
cess and not through unequal possession of
information. He concluded that the result
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supports the view that a firm’s strategic
choice depend on the environment in which
the firm operates.
Structural Misfit (Cell 3 and 6)
The structural misfit deals with the re-
lationship between control structure and
strategy. The premise is that control struc-
ture should be designed in such a way to suit
the chosen strategy. With its primary empha-
sis on cost reduction, a cost efficiency firm
prefers to keep its product offerings stable
overtime and have narrow product lines in
order to minimize inventory carrying costs as
well as to benefit from scale economies
(Hambrick 1983). In addition, cost efficiency
firms tend to employ routine tasks and pro-
duce standard, undifferentiated products. As
such, the knowledge of means and ends is
relatively high and task programmability is
also high. Miles and Snow (1978) character-
ized the control structure of  cost efficiency
firms as very detailed, emphasizing on prob-
lem solving, and highly centralized. These
authors also propose that control may also
be achieved through creating highly special-
ized work roles, formalized job descriptions,
and standard operating procedures. Similarly,
Porter (1985) suggests that highly structured
organizations are suitable for a cost efficiency
focus. Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) pro-
pose that firms emphasizing on efficiency
should use tight control systems to limit man-
agers’ discretionary spending and to focus
management efforts on performing their tasks
efficiently. Therefore, control structures that
are highly centralized and formal (dominant
control structure) are suitable for firms pur-
suing a strategy of  cost efficiency because
the information required to make decisions
is programmable and can be formalized ne-
glecting the possibility of overburdening the
hierarchy.
Firms that pursue a strategy of  innova-
tion, by contrast, tend to pursue novel op-
portunities in the marketplace and require
new fabrication and marketing techniques
which require high involvements of manag-
ers within the firm (Miller 1987). Prior re-
search has found that strategy of  innovation
is associated with high level of uncertainty
(e.g., Govindarajan 1986; Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967; Burns and Stalker 1961).
Govindarajan (1986), for example, argues that
innovative firms would face higher uncer-
tainty due to the following reasons: first, with
strong emphasis on new product develop-
ments, innovative firms will face high uncer-
tainty since they are betting on products that
have not yet crystallized.
Second, firms employing a strategy of
innovation tend to have a broad set of prod-
uct in order to create uniqueness. Previous
researchers (e.g., Gupta 1987; Chandler 1962)
have argued that product breadth is associ-
ated with high environmental complexity and
consequently with uncertainty.
Finally, creating and sustaining innova-
tion require incurring discretionary expendi-
tures in several areas such as improvement
of  quality and speed of  delivery, advertising
to build product image, and research and de-
velopment. Accordingly, implementing an in-
novation strategy is likely to require decisions
making by intuitive judgment. Because cre-
ativity and innovativeness are crucial to dif-
ferentiate themselves in the market, firms that
adopt a strategy of  innovation will benefit
more from a control structure that promote
high involvement and freedom of their man-
agers (i.e., shared control structure) than
those that adopt a low cost strategy. In addi-
tion, as uncertainty increases, information
processed tend to be unstructured and more
complex. As a result, more exceptions arise
that must be referred upward in the hierar-
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chy which might be overloaded and serious
delays develop between the upward transmis-
sion of  information about new situations and
a response to that information downward
(Tushman and Nadler 1978). An effective
way to deal with such a situation is to move
the level of decision-making to where infor-
mation exists rather than to bring it upward
in the hierarchy, suggesting decentralization
in decision-making is a proper response to
increased uncertainty and to prevent from
overburdening the top management with un-
necessary information (Govindarajan 1986;
Tushman and Nadler 1978).
Empirical research has generally sup-
ported the strategy-control structure linkage
(Simons 1990; Govindarajan 1988; Miller
1987; Hambrick 1981). Miller (1987), for
example, reports that centralized, formal con-
trol structure is positively related to cost ef-
ficiency strategy but negatively related to
strategy of  innovation. In an in-depth study
of  two firms using two different strategies
(innovation and cost efficiency), Simons
(1990), reports that the innovative firm uses
more decentralized control system while the
cost efficiency firm uses a more centralized
control structure. Based on data from strate-
gic business unit general managers and their
superiors from 24 firms on the Fortune 500
list, Govindarajan (1988) finds that innova-
tive firms use more decentralized control
structure while cost efficiency firms use more
centralized control structure. This author also
reports that strategic business units employ-
ing a strategy of  innovation rely more on loose
control mechanisms and strategic business
units employing a strategy of  cost efficiency
rely more on tight control system.
The preceding discussions suggest that
a dominant control structure is a fit for firms
pursuing a strategy of  cost efficiency but a
misfit for firms pursuing a strategy of  inno-
vation. In contrast, a shared control struc-
ture is a fit for firms pursuing a strategy of
innovation but a misfit for firms pursuing a
strategy of  cost efficiency.
We predict that the degree of  fit among
environment, strategy and control structure
will be associated with shareholder value cre-
ation while a strategy and/or structural mis-
fit will be associated with shareholder value
destruction. Specifically, the following hy-
potheses will be tested:
H
1
: At the announcement of IJV formation, inves-
tors will value Strategy and structural misfits
(cell 1 and 8) lower than the perfect fit (cell 4
and 5)
H
2
: At the announcement of IJV formation, inves-
tors will value structural misfit (cell 3 and 6)
lower than the perfect fit (cell 4 and 5).
H
3
: At the announcement of IJV formation, inves-
tor will value strategy misfit (cell 2 and 7) lower
than the perfect fit (cell 4 and 5)
Methodology
Sample Selection
The sample is restricted to publicly-
traded U.S. manufacturing firms that an-
nounce a joint venture formation in the Dow
Jones News Retrieval Service. The manufac-
turing industry was selected as the research
sample because firms in this industry tend to
employ different types of  strategy to com-
pete effectively. In addition, firms in this in-
dustry have been facing fierce competition
both domestically and internationally to cap-
ture local and world’s market share (Meric et
al. 2002) and therefore are expected to re-
spond to their competitive environment by
adopting a strategy and control structure that
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fit the environment. The use of a single in-
dustry sample also minimizes the problem of
sample heterogeneity (Moores and Yuen
2001).
Data were collected from an online data
source, the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.
We searched for announcements of  joint ven-
ture formation between publicly-traded U.S.
manufacturing firms and non-U.S. partners.
To minimize the confounding effects of  vari-
ous economically relevant events (e.g., re-
structuring) on market performance mea-
sures, we follow McWilliams and Siegel’s
(1997) suggestion to eliminate firms who an-
nounced events other than joint venture for-
mation during the two-day “announcement
window” of interest consisting of the day a
firm’s joint venture participation was first
publicly announced and the following day.
The numbers of  IJV formation announce-
ments that meet this data requirement are
648.
To form the database for this study, ad-
ditional data were collected from a variety
of  sources. CRSP tapes provide information
about the dependent variable (abnormal re-
turns). The Value Line Investment Surveys pro-
vide information about the environment (i.e.,
entry barriers). The Dow Jones News Retrieval
Service also provides data about types of  strat-
egy, and types of  control structure. These
additional data requirements reduce our
sample firms to 141.
Variable Measurement
Abnormal Return
Abnormal returns are measured as the
difference between stock market return as-
sociated with the announcement of  the firm’s
participation in a JV (i.e., actual return), and
the firm’s historical return (i.e., normal re-
turn). Following a standard market model, the
abnormal return on day t for each firm i is
calculated as AR
it
 = R
it 
– (a
i
 + b
i
 * R
mt
), where
R
it 
= actual rate of  return for firm i on day t;
a
i
 = the estimated intercept for firm i; b
i
 =
the slope of  parameters for firm i; and R
mt
 =
rate of return on the value-weighted market
portfolio on day t. The model was estimated
over a 200-day period beginning 51 days be-
fore the announcement of  JV formation. The
abnormal returns are cumulated over the two-
day announcement window. This aggregation
is a common practice in event studies, and is
done to account for capital markets reaction
to announcements that may have been made
after trading hours (McWilliams and Siegel
1997).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Overall Sample
Conditions Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Perfect Fit (n=39) 0.0034 0.0295 -0.0312 0.0680
Both Misfits (n=25) -0.0096 0.0314 -0.0361 0.0281
Structural Misfit (n=34) -0.0073 0.0236 -0.0311 0.0378
Strategy Misfit (n=43) 0.0035 0.0298 -0.0612 0.0483
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Environment
Environment is measured based on con-
tent analyses (Webber 1990) of  the descrip-
tive information about firm-level entry bar-
riers owned by American parents in their core
business provided in Value Line Investment
Surveys. This information was analyzed for in-
dicators of  firm-level entry barriers. In most
cases, the tone and content of analyst reports
tend to be stable, so it is relatively easy to
assess the magnitude of  firm-level entry bar-
riers. In cases where the tone and content of
an analyst’s report were of  a mixed nature,
the observation was dropped from analysis.
We measure entry barriers on a five-point or-
dinal scale (1= low entry barriers to 5= high
entry barriers). In general, this protocol fully
agrees with suggestions for operationalizing
resource-based concepts related to subjective
measurement of  entry barriers (e.g., see
Godfrey and Hill 1995; Robins and Wiersema
1995; Rouse and Daellenbach 1999). Follow-
ing are two examples of  information used to
classify the environment as high entry barri-
ers and low entry barriers found in the Value
Line Investment Surveys:
An example of ‘unique resources’. “Unit
shipments in the forms industry have
declined…and profit margins have been
squeezed significantly as a result of struc-
tural changes…[Standard Register’s] forms
business has been helped during this pe-
riod by proprietary electronic systems…..
These forms processing systems, as well as
the equipment division’s expertise …should
continue to enable [Standard Register’s]
forms segment to outpace the industry in-
coming years” (emphasis added).
An example of ‘substitutability of re-
source deployment outcomes’. AT&T
has launched a new residential calling
plan...We [at Value Line] see this new pro-
gram as a defensive maneuver. It appears
aimed at stemming the loss of residential
customers to rivals MCI Communications’
Friends and Family and Sprint’s The Most plans”
(underline added).
Strategy
This study uses Porter’s (1980) strategy
framework, since that conceptualization is
considered by many as academically well ac-
cepted and internally consistent (Dess and
Davis 1984; Hambrick 1983). Porter (1980)
argues that to achieve a sustainable competi-
tive advantage, a firm must choose either to
compete on the basis of efficiency (low cost)
or innovation (product differentiation). A
firm’s strategic orientation is determined
based on information provided by the parent
company regarding its motivation to form the
IJVs. We only include firms that clearly indi-
cate whether the IJV establishment is a ve-
hicle to increase efficiency or to promote the
firm’s ability to innovate. Following are two
examples of motivation underlying the IJV
formation found in the Value Line Investment
Surveys.
An example of ‘Efficiency-Seeking’
STRATEGY. “The joint venture
will…encompass manufacturing plants,
parts distribution depots, engineering, train-
ing, and test centers and administrative of-
fices in the U.S., Canada, and Brazil”
(Source: JV formation announcement).
Value Line elaborates: “The year…saw [the
firm] take significant steps…including joint
venture agreements in order to gain economies
of scale” (emphasis added).
An example of  ‘INNOVATION’
STRATEGY. An example of  ‘resource
efficiency’. “The pricing of mature drug
products has been under pressure, due to
[America’s] efforts to control healthcare
costs. Generic competition is also likely to
remain keen. Nonetheless, market penetra-
tion by newly launched products and fur-
ther product introductions...should bring about
higher profits [for American Cyanamid].....
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Cyanamid’s overall product development
efforts should pay off over t ime...[The
company’s] agricultural group should also per-
form well, having already gained a strong presence
in many global markets” (emphasis added).
Control Structure
Control structure is determined based
on information about the types of  control the
parent company wants to use to manage the
newly created joint venture, available in the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service. This study
classifies the control structure used by the
parent firm to manage the IJVs into two cat-
egories: shared control structure and domi-
nant control structure. We exclude firms that
do not state clearly their intention to use a
particular control structure. Following are two
examples of  the types of  control structure
use by the parent company to manage the IJV.
Example 1 of ‘unilateral’ decision-
making. “Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd. of  Aus-
tralia and Budapesti Kiloripari Vallalat said
they entered an agreement to form a joint
venture company…Coca-Cola Amatil [a
subsidiary] of  Coca-Cola Co. will have man-
agement control.” (Source: JV formation an-
nouncement; emphasis added).
Example 2 of ‘unilateral’ decision-
making. “Union [a joint venture partner]
will be the developer and operator of the
new Dow-Sarnia storage pool, and will
also administer the joint agreement.” (Source:
JV formation announcement; emphasis
added).
Example 3 of ‘unilateral’ decision-
making. “Gillette Co. said it signed a joint
venture with a Soviet concern to
make…razor blades, shaving systems and
disposable razors…Gillette would have
management control and a 65 percent equity
stake in the company.” (Source: JV forma-
tion announcement; emphasis added).
Example of  ‘shared’ decision-making.
“Gexa Corp. said it has reached a final joint
venture agreement with Echo Bay…The
venture will be directed by a management
committee comprised of members from
both companies.” (Source: JV formation an-
nouncement; emphasis added).
Statistical Analyses and
Results
Of  the 141 firms, 39 firms shows per-
fect fit, 25 firms have both strategy and struc-
tural misfits, 34 firms have structural misfit,
and 43 firms have strategy misfit. Table 2
presents the descriptive statistics and the re-
sults of the General Linear Model procedures
of analyzing the effects of misfits on share-
holder value. Consistent with our predictions,
the mean abnormal returns for IJVs with both
misfits (-0.0096) and IJVs with structural
misfit (-0.0073) are lower than those of  IJV’s
that have perfect fit (0.0034). Contrary to our
prediction, however, the mean abnormal re-
turns of  IJVs with strategy misfit (0.0035)
are slightly higher than those of IJVs that have
perfect fit (0.0034).
The overall F-statistics for the General
Linear Model procedure is significant (F =
5.73; p < 0.001) indicating that the fit and
misfits conditions significantly affect the
variation in the abnormal returns. Hypoth-
esis 1 (H
1
) predicts that investors will value
IJVs that have both strategy and structural
misfits lower than IJVs that have perfect fit.
The results reveal that the abnormal returns
of  IJVs that have both strategy and struc-
tural misfits are significantly lower than those
of IJVs that have perfect fit (F = 2.38; p <
0.05).1 These results confirm Hypothesis 1
(H
1
). Hypothesis 2 (H
2
) expects that inves-
1 All reported p-values are one-tailed because we are testing directional hypotheses
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tors will value IJVs that have structural mis-
fit lower than IJVs that have perfect fit. The
results show that the abnormal returns of
IJVs that have structural misfit are signifi-
cantly lower than those of IJVs that have
perfect fit (F = 16.14; p < 0.0001). These
results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 (H
2
).
Hypothesis 3 (H
3
) predicts that investors will
value IJVs that have strategy misfit lower
than IJVs that have perfect fit. The results
show that the abnormal returns of  IJVs that
have strategy misfit is significantly higher than
those of IJVs that have perfect fit (F = 8.31;
p < 0.001). These results contradict Hypoth-
esis 3 (H
3
).
Table 2. Results of  the General Linear Model Procedure
Comparison NDF DDF F-value p-Value
Both Misfits vs. Perfect Fit 1 135 2.38 <0.05 **
Structural Misfit vs. Perfect Fit 1 135 16.14 <0.0001 ***
Strategy Misfit vs. Perfect Fit 1 135 8.31 <0.001 ***
*; **; ***; denote significant levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. All p-values are one-tailed since all the hypotheses
are directional hypotheses.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Sample Partitioned by Level of  Entry Barriers
Panel A: Low Entry Barriers
Conditions Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Perfect Fit (n=12) 0.0612 0.0061 0.0431 0.0680
Both Misfits (n=14) -0.0193 0.0281 -0.0213 -0.0028
Structural Misfit (n=20) -0.0078 0.0315 -0.0375 0.0378
Panel B: High Entry Barriers
Conditions Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Perfect Fit (n=27) -0.0013 0.0191 -0.0312 0.0399
Both Misfits (n=11) -0.0016 0.0114 -0.0361 0.0281
Structural Misfit (n=14) -0.0058 0.0128 -0.0311 0.0283
Strategy Misfit (n=28) 0.0037 0.0271 -0.0612 0.0483
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We conducted further analyses to inves-
tigate the contradictory results regarding Hy-
pothesis 3 (H
3
). We partition our sample based
on the two levels of entry barriers (low and
high). Table 3 shows the descriptive statis-
tics of  the sample firms partitioned by the
level of  entry barriers.
Table 3 reveals that all the IJVs that have
strategy misfit mostly operate in the high en-
try barriers environment. It might be that when
firms possess resources that are hard to be
imitated by their competitors, firms can com-
pete effectively using either innovative or cost
efficiency strategy and, therefore investors do
not penalize firms that have strategy misfits
when entry barriers are high and pay more
attention to information about fit (misfit)
when the entry barriers are low.
To investigate whether investors value
fit (misfit) differently across different lev-
els of entry barriers, we compare the ab-
normal returns of  IJVs that have perfect
fit and both strategy and structural misfits
in low entry barriers with those in high en-
try barriers. Figure 2 illustrates the abnor-
mal returns of  the sample firms under condi-
tions of fit (misfit) partitioned by the level
of  entry barriers. As shown in Figure 2, IJVs
that have both strategy and structural mis-
fits in low entry barriers are valued lower than
IJVs that have strategy and structural misfits
in high entry barriers (mean abnormal returns
of -0.0193 and 0.0016 respectively). In ad-
dition, IJVs that have perfect fit in low entry
barriers are valued higher than IJVs that have
perfect fit in high entry barriers (mean abnor-
Figure 2. Environmental Effects on the Relationship between Misfits and Fit
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mal returns of 0.0612 and -0.0013 respec-
tively).2 The results of these additional pro-
cedures indicate that investors pay more at-
tention and impound the information about
fit/misfits into the stock price more when the
entry barriers are low as compared to when
the entry barriers are high. This is not sur-
prising because when the entry barriers are
low, firms’ performances are very sensitive
to competitive pressure. By contrast, when
the entry barriers are high, firms’ perfor-
mances tend to be stable due to less com-
petitive pressure.
Discussion and Direction for
Future Research
This study investigates the effects of
fit (misfits) among environment, strategy, and
control structure on share holder wealth on
the announcement of  IJVs formation. Con-
sistent with our predictions, this study found
that IJVs that have perfect fit are valued
higher than those with both strategy and
structural misfits and also those with struc-
tural misfit. One contradictory result was
found when comparing IJVs that have per-
fect fit with those that have strategy misfit.
While we expect that IJVs that have perfect
fit will be valued higher than those with strat-
egy misfit, the result shows the opposite.
Further analyses indicate that all cases that
show strategy misfit are firms that mostly
operate in high entry barriers. One potential
explanation for this contradictory result is that
under high entry barriers, firms can compete
effectively using either innovation or cost
efficiency strategy due to the fact that the
firms possess resources that are difficult to
be imitated by their competitors. Further in-
vestigations also confirm our argument that
investors tend to pay more attention to in-
formation about fit (misfit) when the entry
barriers are low as compared to when the entry
barriers are high.
This study makes three contributions to
the literature investigating the relationship be-
tween the announcement of  IJV formation
and share holder value. First, we use the con-
cept of  fit among environment, strategy, and
control structure and investigate the effects
of fit (misfit) on share holder value creation
(destruction). Although this concept is widely
used in accounting and strategic management
literature, it has not been tested in the con-
text of  IJVs.
Second, we deconstruct the notion of  fit
into strategy and structural misfits and inves-
tigate their individual and joint effects on
shareholder value creation (destruction) as-
sociated with initial public announcement of
IJV formation.
Third, we find that the notion of fit
among environment, strategy, and control
structure matters. The higher abnormal re-
turns of IJVs that have perfect fit as compared
to those with both strategy and structural
misfits, and those with structural misfit is con-
sistent with the widely held belief in the ac-
counting and strategic management literature
that the fit between environment, strategy and
control structure positively affect performance.
The results of  this study, however,
should be interpreted in light of two limita-
tions. First, the competitive environment used
in this study is based on a subjective mea-
sure of  firm-level entry barriers. It might not
2 For strategy misfit and structural misfit, the results are similar for both the low entry barriers and the high entry
barriers.
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necessarily reflect the true nature of  competi-
tive environment faced by the firms. Future
research might consider other measures of
environment such as earning volatility or
types of  technology.
Second, this study uses data from manu-
facturing sectors. Future research needs to
examine whether the results reported in this
study can be extended to other industries.
Although the use of single industry data mini-
mizes the sample heterogeneity problems, our
understanding of the impact of fit among en-
vironment, strategy, and control structure
would be enhanced if it is generalized across
industries.
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